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Marital Rape: A Unique Blend of Domestic
Violence and Non-Marital Rape Issues
Morgan Lee Woolley
I. INTRODUCTION
Although marital rape has been a pervasive socio-cultural problem for
centuries, most activity involving the recognition, criminalization, and
reform of marital rape laws has occurred in the past few decades.1 U.S.
courts and legislators have recently revisited the issue of marital rape, and
the issue has taken on increasing importance internationally.2 However
approaches to addressing the global problem of marital rape are often
problematic because they easily become tangled and lost within the larger
analytical, legislative, and enforcement frameworks of domestic violence
and non-marital rape.3 Social attitudes and legislation regarding domestic
violence are often caught in a tension between family privacy and
victim/survivor protection, whereas non-marital rape is often lodged
* J.D. Candidate, May 2007, University of California, Hastings College of the Law;
B.A., English & Comparative Literature & Psychology, 2004, Occidental College.
Author's Dedication: This Note is dedicated to the many survivors of marital rape,
whose struggle is both deeply devastating and personal, but also courageous and fervent.
Acknowledgements: I would like to thank Lois A. Weithorn and Richard Nelson for
their reviews and guidance in preparation of this note. I would also like to thank the
editorial board and staff of the Hastings Women 's Law Journalfor all of their assistance and
support
1. In fact, it was not until 1993 that marital rape became a crime in all fifty states.
See Raquel Kennedy Bergen, Marital Rape, Nat'l Electronic Network on Violence Against
Women
(1999),
http://www.vawnet.org/DomesticViolence/Research/VAWnetDocs/
AR-mrape.pdf ("Despite the prevalence of marital rape, this problem has received relatively
little attention from social scientists, practitioners, the criminal justice system, and larger
society as a whole.").
2. See Senan Hogan, Ireland Still Doesn't See Marital Rape as Criminal, THE IR.
NEWS LIMITED, Nov. 19, 2005, at 16 ("Marital rape became a criminal offence in the
Republic in 1990, ahead of the UK, but 25 years behind Sweden.").
3. See Sarah Harless, From the Bedroom to the Courtroom: The Impact of Domestic
Violence Law on Marital Rape Victims, 35 RUTGERS L.J. 305, 306 (2003) ("The current
framework for marital rape laws leave much room for improvement. But improvement to
what? The current framework laid by the domestic violence movement is an inadequate
foundation for improving marital rape laws.").
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between problems of consent and evidentiary proof. However marital rape
is a unique problem that encompasses both physical violence and the
psychological trauma of being raped by someone who has taken marriage
vows to love and honor his or her spouse. Thus a comprehensive
framework for marital rape must include aspects of the emotional and
physical cruelty, as well as the exposure of family privacy, that often
accompanies domestic violence. Additionally marital rape laws must
include a reassessment of traditional notions that marriage represents
implied consent and the unique difficulties of evidentiary proof in
prosecuting marital rape.
This Note will argue that in order to adequately address the
fundamental issues of marital rape, social, judicial, legislative and
enforcement networks must draw upon a hybrid framework that
encompasses concerns relevant to both domestic violence and non-marital
rape. Subsuming marital rape under either paradigm, to assess marital rape
as we would treat domestic violence or non-marital rape, fails to account
for the unique circumstances and consequences of rape that is perpetrated
by one's own spouse. Specifically, this Note will address the domestic and
international treatment of marital rape and the inadequacies of responding
to marital rape solely within the rubric of domestic violence or non-marital
rape. Part II will analyze the historical and social paradigms surrounding
domestic violence and non-marital rape. Part III will address current legal
developments in marital rape in the United States and explore the ways in
which the marital rape exemption still exists in some form today. Part IV
will focus on the treatment of marital rape on an international level by
looking at developments by the United Nations and the European
Parliament. Part V will analyze the gross inadequacies and difficulties of
effectively addressing marital rape as a separate framework outside of the
paradigms of domestic violence and non-marital rape. In addition, this
final section will present a policy argument for the need for uniquely
tailored legislation and enforcement mechanisms as well as a shift in social
attitudes in order to effectively comprehend and repudiate marital rape
today.
II. A DISTINCTION IN FRAMEWORKS
This section will analyze the historical underpinnings of domestic
violence and the treatment of non-marital rape as well as the legal and
social conflicts that arise when dealing with these problems. It will then
address the historical and legal treatment of marital rape and explore its
unique characteristics and their distinct economic, social, physical, and
psychological effects.
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A. DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: TENSION BETWEEN FAMILY PRIVACY AND
PROTECTION FROM THE STATE

Domestic violence occurs when an abuser uses threats and/or acts of4
physical violence in an effort to control and intimidate the victim.
Domestic violence most frequently occurs between intimates, spouses,
former spouses, family members, or household members.5 Women are
typically the victims of violence perpetrated by intimates.6 The United
Nations (UN) defines domestic violence in a way that encompasses genderbased violence and sexual violence: "[A]ny act of gender-based violence
that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual, or psychological
harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts, coercion or
arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or private
7
life."
The roots of domestic violence in the western world can be found in
traditional Roman and Christian notions of the right of men to physically
and socially dominate women in their familial, social, and marital
capacities. 8 Fathers regulated their entire households and men dominated
women in social settings. 9 "In early Rome, a husband was legally vested
with the power to discipline his wife as the law enforcer within the family
structure. The authority of the male was so broad that the husband could
call a family council and sentence the woman to death with no public
trial." 1 ° Social support and acceptance reinforced the disciplinary power
that men had over their wives and daughters, creating a shroud of privacy
within the home that no outsider would dare to penetrate. The institution of
marriage propelled and reinforced traditional justifications for this
4. Marya Lucas, An Invitation to Liability?: Attempts at Holding Victims of Domestic
Violence Liable as Accomplices When They Invite Violations of Their Own Protective
Orders, 5 GEO.J. GENDER & L. 763, 766 (2004).
5. U.S. Department of Justice, Bureau of Justice Statistics, http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/
bjs/cvictc.htm#relate (last visited March 3, 2006). See generally Katherine E. Volovski,
Crime and Punishment Law Chapter: Domestic Violence, 5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 175
(2004) (discussing different aspects of domestic violence).
6. U.S. Dept. of Justice, supra note 5. ("Female victims are more likely to be
victimized by intimates than male victims. In 2004, of those offenders victimizing females,
21% were described as intimates and 34% as strangers. By contrast, of those offenders
victimizing males, 4% were described as intimates and 50% as strangers.").
7. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, G.A. Res. 48/104,
U.N. Doc. A/RES/48/104 (Dec. 20, 1993), availableat http://www.un.org/documents/
ga/res/48/a48r 104.htm [hereinafter UN Declaration].
8. Caroline Dettmer, Comment and Casenote, Increased Sentencing for Repeat
Offenders of Domestic Violence in Ohio: Will This End Suffering?, 73 U. CIN. L. REV. 705,
708 (2004) ("More specifically, the right of a man to beat his wife began with the
development of marriage as an institution. After marriage, husband and wife became one that one was the husband. The woman lost her separate legal status under the marriage: the
husband was legally obligated to support his wife, and in return, the wife was legally
obligated to obey her husband.").
9. Id.
10. Id.
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arrangement, including (1) women lost their separate identity and legal
status once married; (2) husbands could be held liable for the illegal actions
of their wives and had the responsibility and power to discipline
accordingly; and (3) domestic chastisement with a rod or stick was socially
and legally condoned for centuries by the "rule of thumb.""
The
institution of marriage and the veil of family privacy sanctioned these
practices.
Marital rape was protected from societal scrutiny or prosecution for
similar reasons. Sarah Harless, a marital rape researcher, noted that
nineteenth century judges did not need to resort to privacy considerations
because there were no laws against marital rape at the time.' 2 She further
stated, "[m]ost Americans in the nineteenth century probably could not
comprehend the notion that a man could rape his wife. Indeed, society
viewed men as the protectors of women." 13 These attitudes remained and
were largely accepted in social and legal spheres well into the nineteenth
century.14
Once chastisement began to face considerable criticism, and with a
growing nineteenth-century feminist movement that repudiated violence,
courts found a new (and some argue an even more resilient) justification in
the notion of privacy.' 5 A dichotomy emerged between public spheres,
encompassing activities of the state, and private spheres, including all
activities within the family home.' 6 "The home is in the private sphere
where the state does not interfere."' 7 In State v. Hussey, one judge
expressed a concern that prosecuting domestic violence as analogous to
other forms of assault would "throw open the bedroom to the gaze of the
public, and spread discord and misery, contention and strife, where peace
and concord ought to reign.',' 8 The public/private dichotomy created a
tension between state protection of domestic violence victims and the
state's historical reluctance to interfere in familial privacy. 19 However
11. Dettmer, supra note 8, at 709-10; See also Volovksi, supra note 5, at 175 ("Prior
to the twentieth century, the criminal law condoned domestic violence by granting a man the
right to beat his wife, so long as the stick he used was not wider than the width of his
thumb.").
12. Harless, supra note 3, at 314.
13. Id.
14. Dettmer, supra note 8, at 709 ("Even with legal prohibitions of violence,
patriarchal ideologies still persisted in the criminal justice system. Even today, beliefs
persist that domestic violence is a private matter and less serious than other violent crime.").
15. Kapila Juthani, Police Treatment of Domestic Violence and Sexual Abuse:
Affirmative Duty to Protectvs. Fourth Amendment Privacy, 59 N.Y.U. ANN. SURv. AM. L.
51, 55 (2003).
16. Dettmer, supra note 8, at 711.
17. Id.
18. State v. Hussey, 44 N.C. (Busb.) 123, 126-27 (1852), reprinted in Reva B.
Seigel, The Rule of Love: Wife-Beating as Prerogative and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117,
2153 (1996).
19. Dettmer, supra note 8, at 710-12; Harless, supra note 3, at 313-14.

Summer 20071

MARITAL RAPE

notions of privacy and defending the unity of the family seemed to have
stronger social and legal support, becoming one of the hallmark arguments
for not aggressively prosecuting acts of domestic violence.2 ° Caroline
Dettmer, a researcher and advocate against domestic violence, argued, "the
eradication of domestic violence was not as important as keeping the home
life free from state interference. That is, preventing violence was not as
important as maintaining long-held beliefs in the husbands' duty and
obligation to maintain control over their wives.",21 Even today, there are
some residual beliefs amongst lawmakers, police and the public that
domestic violence should be treated as a private matter and as a less serious
crime than similar assaults.22
B. NON-MARITAL RAPE: TENSION BETWEEN CONSENT AND PROOF

At common law, rape is defined as "unlawful carnal knowledge of a
woman forcibly and against her will.

'23

The UN's definition, discussed

above in Section II.A., includes rape as a form of domestic violence against
women. 24 Overall, the social and legislative framework of non-marital rape
is quite different from that of domestic violence. A U.S. Department of
Justice study showed that while domestic violence usually involves female
victims, rape cases often reveal a more defined gender correlation to
illustrate that wife-rape occurs more often than rape by a stranger. 25
Furthermore, while domestic violence may include a range of physical and
sexual assaults, common law rape requires the elements of non-consent,
show of resistance by the victim, use of force by the perpetrator and some
degree of penetration.26 The standard of U.S. courts is to recognize that an
individual is innocent until guilt can be proven beyond a reasonable doubt.
However, archaic laws and beliefs surrounding rape often afforded the
perpetrator a layer of protection by placing a heavy focus on consent and
forcing the victim to prove her innocence.27 The Model Penal Code (MPC)
originally stated: "A male who has sexual intercourse with a female not his

20. Dettmer, supra note 8, at 711.

21. Id.
22. Id. at 712 ("Police officers and other agents of the law often treat violence
against women lightly by directing attention to the woman as provocateur.").
23. WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 210 (1778),
availableat http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/bla-415.htm (last visited April 10,
2007). See also Commonwealth v. Chretien, 383 Mass. 123, 127 (1981).
24. UN Declaration, supra note 7.

25. Lawrence

Greenfeld, Bureau of JusticeStatistics, Sexual Offenses and Offenders:

An Analysis of Data on Rape and Sexual Assault (1997), available at
http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/pub/pdf/soo.pdf (last visited Jan. 25, 2007). Additional rape
statistics are available at http://www.ucdmaar.org/facts2.htm.
26. Emily O'Brien & Alexandra Minoff, Crime and Punishment Law Chapter: Rape,
5 GEO. J. GENDER & L. 243, 245 (2004).
27. Travis Weitzel, The Constitutionality of Quasi-Convictions, 36 RUTGERS L.J.
1029, 1042 (2005).
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wife is guilty of rape."2 8 There is no presumption of belief in the victim's
account, so the focus shifts from the perpetrator on trial to the victim. A
victim must then justify sexual history, dress, lifestyle, and attitude to
repudiate any hint of invitation. Furthermore, the MPC may infer a lack of
consent if there is a showing of force that overcomes resistance, results in
great or immediate bodily harm or death, or if the consent is obtained from
one who does not have the capacity to consent. 29 The MPC also has an
additional hurdle of showing recklessness with regard to non-consent or
negligence if the perpetrator is voluntarily intoxicated.3 °
Until very recently, most states also had other requirements such as
filing a prompt complaint (usually within 3 months), providing
corroborative evidence of the assault, and cautionary instructions to jurors
to review facts with suspicion. 31 The MPC currently states that in any
sexual assault prosecution, "the jury shall be instructed to evaluate the
testimony of a victim or complaining witness with special care in view of
the emotional involvement of the witness and the difficulty of determining
the truth with respect to alleged activities carried out in private. 32 Thus
the legal framework for rape focuses on consent and evidentiary proof,
which become even more complex issues when the act occurs between
spouses.
C. MARITAL RAPE:

A UNIQUE PROBLEM

In addition to deeply entrenched social and legal customs, as well as
justifications traditionally associated with domestic violence, marital rape
encompasses a distinct paradigm that draws upon elements of the tensions
found in domestic violence (family privacy versus protection) and nonmarital rape (consent and issues of proof). Marital rape is a distinctive
problem that must recognize the convergence of issues of domestic
violence and non-marital rape to create a separate analytical framework.
Domestic violence is often considered a private matter, much like sexual
relations within a marriage. Since women who are raped by their husbands
are exposed to attacks by someone they presumably loved and trusted,
many marital rape survivors suffer severe and long-term psychological
consequences.33 Michelle Anderson, a professor of law and scholar on
marital rape, summarized several wife-rape studies conducted by
researchers such as Diana Russell, M. Randall and L. Haskell, and David
28.
29.
30.
31.

MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.1 (1962).
Id.
Id.
Michelle Anderson, The Legacy of the Prompt Complaint Requirement,

CorroborationRequirement, and Cautionary Instructions on Campus Sexual Assault, 84

B.U.L. REv. 945, 949 (2004).
32. MODEL PENAL CODE § 213.6(5) (1962).

33. Bergen, supra note 1, at 4 (Bergen takes a close look at the psychological
impacts of marital rape).
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Finkelhor and Kersti Yllo. She concluded that wife-rape "often evokes a
powerful sense of betrayal, deep disillusionment, and total isolation ...
[which] can be even more extreme for victims of wife-rape. 34 In addition,
both domestic violence and marital rape occur within the bounds of the
family and thus, victims are especially reliant upon outside protection from
the police and courts. The problem is that law enforcement and the courts
often withhold protection when it is most crucially needed out of respect
for family privacy. 35 Notably not all marital rape survivors are battered
wives. Raquel Bergen, a researcher and scholar on marital rape, noted that
assimilating marital rape survivors into the category of other domestic
violence victims "ignores the reality that some women are raped by their
husbands but do not experience other forms of violence... [and] to
of domestic violence excludes
categorize marital rape only as an extension
36
experiences."
their
and
these women
Unique legislative and social attitudes perpetuated by society are
supported by certain traditional justifications for marital rape. Prior to the
twentieth century and under English common law, a man could not be
prosecuted for raping his wife.37 Most rape statutes, including the MPC,
stipulated that rape was forced sexual intercourse with a woman not his
wife, thus creating a marital rape exemption for husbands. 38 The four main
justifications for such statutes were: (1) according to biblical and Roman
law, a woman was the legal property of her husband, or father if
unmarried; 39 (2) the feudal doctrine of coverture stipulated that a woman's
independent legal identity was consolidated or subsumed into that of her
husband, holding the married couple as one at law; 40 (3) the reluctance of
courts and law enforcement to interfere with private matters within a
marriage; 4' and (4) as Sir Matthew Hale, the Chief Justice in seventeenth34. Michelle Anderson, Marital Immunity, Intimate Relationships, and Improper
References: A New Law on Sexual Offenses by Intimates, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1465, 1512
(2003) ("One reason that wife rapes are so traumatic is that victims are less likely to tell
family members, rape crisis counselors, or police officers about their experiences, and they
are less likely to receive support when they do."). See also Diana: Russell, RAPE IN
MARRIAGE 9 (Macmillan Press 1990); David Finkelhor & Kersti Yllo, LICENSE TO RAPE:
SEXUAL ABUSE OF WIvES 6-7 (Adam Bellow ed., The Free Press 1985); M. Randall & L.
Haskell, Sexual Violence in Women's Lives, VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN 1(1), 6-31 (1995).
35. Juthani, supra note 15, at 55.
36. Bergen, supra note 1, at 3.
37. Anderson, supra note 34, at 1465.
38. Id. at 1477.
39. Katherine Schelong, Domestic Violence and the State: Responses to and
Rationales for Spousal Battering, Marital Rape & Stalking, 78 MARQ. L. REv. 79, 85
(1994).
40. Schelong, supra note 39, at 86; Deborah Bell, Family Law at the Turn of the
Century, 71 MISs. L. J. 781, 822 (2002).
41. Seigel, supra note 18, at 2120 (discussing a reluctance to interfere in private
matters in cases of wife-beating); Andreea Vesa, Internationaland Regional Standardsfor
Protecting Victims of Domestic Violence, 12 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 309, 317
(2004).
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century England, proposed, marriage granted a wife's ongoing and
unbreakable consent to sexual intercourse.42 Thus courts and society in
general were extremely reluctant to acknowledge that rape of a spouse was
the same criminal violation as rape of a stranger and deserved equal (or
perhaps more severe) punishment.
Under traditional property theories, women were considered the
property of their husbands, or fathers if unmarried. First, the concept of
marital rape was a legal nullity analogous to the inability to steal what one
already owns. "The rape of a married woman by her husband himself was
not a transgression at all because a man was allowed to treat his chattel as
he deemed appropriate. '' 3 Thus women who were forced to have sex in
their marriage did not even have the option of seeking criminal
prosecution. 44
Second, the marital rape exemption was defended under the assertion
that a husband and wife acted in concert and the wife had no separate rights
apart from her husband. The husband was legally responsible for his wife's
conduct.45 Sir William Blackstone expounded upon the English common
law notion that "by marriage, the husband and wife are one person in law:
that is, the very being or legal existence of the woman is suspended during
the marriage, or at least incorporated and consolidated into that of the
husband."A6 This doctrine of coverture gave husbands physical and legal
control over their wives.4 7 Once married, women lacked legal standing
apart from their husbands to enter into contracts, own their own property,
or defend themselves in court.48 Consequently, a husband would be
unlikely to go to court on behalf of his wife to allege he had raped her.
The third justification for the marital rape exemption is that the courts
and police are often reluctant to pierce the veil of privacy regarding sexual
matters as they are seen as at the heart of marital and familial relations.49
Kapila Juthani, a scholar and researcher on police treatment of domestic
violence, argued that domestic violence is "largely unacknowledged by the
public or legal system due in part to the lingering beliefs that the husband
and wife become legally one upon marriage... the law did not reach
42. Matthew Hale, THE HISTORY OF THE
1st Am. Ed. 1847) (1736).
43. Anderson, supra note 34, at 1478.

PLEAS OF THE CROWN

629 (Robert Small ed.,

44. Jill Hasday, Contest and Consent: A Legal History of MaritalRape, 88 CAL. L.

REv. 1373, 1406 (2000).
45. Id. at 1478.
46. William Blackstone, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 442 (1765),
available at http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/blackstone/bla-115.htm (last visited Jan. 30,
2007).
47. Hasday, supra note 44, at 1389.
48. Schelong, supra note 39, at 86.
49. Juthani, supra note 15, at 56 ("Police are particularly susceptible to the influence
of persisting norms of marital and sexual privacy because they retain the discretion that is
inherent in evaluating probable cause for search or arrest.").
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domestic violence largely because it occurred in the private sphere." 50
While the shield of family privacy overlaps both marital rape and domestic
violence in general, courts treated the offense of marital rape as less serious
than domestic violence, reasoning that institution of marriage further
protects the sexual nature of the act. In Shaw v. Shaw, a nineteenth-century
case, the wife petitioned for divorce on the grounds of intolerable cruelty
through her husband's forced sexual demands. 5 1 However a husband
raping his wife was not considered conclusive evidence of cruelty and
marital rape was not held to be sufficient grounds for divorce.52 Thus the
court in Shaw dismissed the petition, determining that although the husband
had endangered his wife's health with his sexual demands, there was no
evidence that he actually had knowledge of the endangerment.53 Again, the
court denied the legitimacy of marital rape as a cause of action.
The fourth (and perhaps most popular) justification for the marital rape
exemption was the notion that a woman's marriage vows provided ongoing
consent to her husband's sexual demands.54 Sir Matthew Hale wrote,
"[t]he husband cannot be guilty of rape committed by himself upon his
lawful wife, for by their mutual and matrimonial consent and contract the
wife hath given up herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot
retract.,55 From the seventeenth through the nineteenth centuries, English
and American courts adhered to Hale's decree despite the fact that societal
norms and beliefs, not recognized legal authority, created this rule.56
The domestic violence framework may leave some issues unaddressed
in an adequate marital rape analysis, but the same problem occurs when
one tries to analyze marital rape through the framework of non-marital
rape. While any rape is a violation of personhood, marital rape results in
distinctive sexual violence and trauma due to a violation of trust and love
associated with the marital bond. Moreover, wife-rape is more common
than rape by a stranger.57 While proving marital rape may involve the same
elements used in non-marital rape, the consent defense may be even more
difficult when augmented and supported by the traditional notions of
50. Dettmer, supra note 8, at 710-11.
51. Shaw v. Shaw, 17 Conn. 189, 196 (1845).
52. Hasday, supra note 44, at 1469.
53. Shaw, 17 Conn. at 196.
54. Anderson, supra note 34, at 1479-80; Weitzel, supra note 27, at 1039 (noting that
courts presumed sex was consensual if a women becomes pregnant).
55. Hale, supra note 42.
56. Anderson, supra note 34, at 1480.
57. Finkelhor & Yllo, supra note 34, at 7. See also Russell, supra note 34, at 9 (In
interviews with more than 900 women, Russell found that eight percent had experienced
rape by a husband. She also noted, "the term wife-rape is preferred over 'marital rape' or
'spousal rape' because it is not gender neutral. The term 'spousal rape' in particular seems
to convey the notion that rape is something that wives do to husbands, if not as readily as
husbands do it to wives, at least sufficiently often that a gender neutral term should be
used.").
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implied consent as discussed above. 8 Furthermore, proof is often more
difficult in a case of marital rape because the act is likely to occur within
the privacy of the home - an area that law enforcement, courts, and
legislators have been reluctant to enter. 59 Thus, analyzing issues of consent
and proof in marital rape, with only an understanding of non-marital rape,
provides an inaccurate picture.60 Marital rape incorporates distinct aspects
of family privacy, protection from the state, consent and proof. Therefore,
the problems associated with marital rape cannot fully be explored,
addressed, or explained by either the framework of domestic violence or
that of non-marital rape.
III. A LOOK AT CURRENT MARITAL RAPE LAWS IN THE
UNITED STATES
While an accurate picture of the prevalence of marital rape in the
United States today is difficult to achieve, one prominent researcher, Diana
Russell, found that of more than 900 women she interviewed,
approximately eight percent had been raped by a husband.6 1 In the United
States, marital rape must be recognized as a criminal offense and treated
separately from domestic violence and non-marital rape. However, in
2003, Professor Michelle Anderson showed that only twenty-four states
and the District of Columbia have completely removed the marital rape
exemption afforded to husbands. 62 She asserted that the remaining twentysix states retain some form of the common law by either providing
exemptions or spousal immunity for sexual offenses other than forcible
rape, maintaining spousal sexual offense statutes that carry less serious
sanctions for the recognized form of marital rape, and/or imposing
additional procedural requirements that serve as hurdles for prosecution of
marital rape.63
The first United States case to recognize the existence of a marital rape
exemption was the 1857 case of Commonwealth v. Fogerty, in which the

58. Anderson, supra note 34, at 1497.
59. Anderson, supra note 31, at 957.
60. Harless, supra note 3, at 324-25 (discussing the emotional, procedural, and
judicial hurdles specifically faced by victims of marital rape).
61. Russell, supra note 34, at 9. For further statistical estimates of the prevalence of
marital rape, see also U.S. Dept. of Justice, supra note 5; Finkelhor & Yllo, supra note 34;
Randall & Haskell, supra note 34, at 23-24.
62. States that treat marital and non-marital rape identically include Arkansas,
Colorado, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Indiana, Kentucky, Maine, Massachusetts, Missouri,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, New Mexico, North Carolina, North
Dakota, Oregon, Pennsylvania, Texas, Utah, Vermont, West Virginia, Wisconsin, and the
District of Columbia. Anderson, supra note 34, at 1468.
63. Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Hawaii, Idaho, Illinois,
Iowa, Kansas, Louisiana, Maryland, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Nevada, New York,
Ohio, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South Dakota, Tennessee, Virginia,
Washington, and Wyoming. Id.
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Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts recognized that evidence of
marriage to the victim would be a defense to rape. 64 Jill Elaine Hasday, a
professor of law and scholar on marital rape, reviewed nineteenth century
cases involving marital rape and observed, "[t]here was not the slightest
suggestion in nineteenth-century case law and treatises that a husband
could be prosecuted for raping his wife. 65 In the early twentieth century,
there were a few unsuccessful prosecutions for marital rape in the United
States.66 However serious attempts to abandon outdated justifications by
challenging the marital rape exemption did not become prevalent until the
mid-1970s, when Nebraska became the first state to legislatively abolish
the marital rape exemption.6 7
In 1984, the Court of Appeals of New York critically examined the
marital rape exemption in the pivotal case of People v. Liberta.68 In
Liberta, the husband-defendant claimed that he could not be prosecuted for
rape or sodomy in the first degree under the New York Penal Law rape
statute, arguing that the term "female," for purposes of the statute, was
defined as any female not married to the actor. 69 He also claimed that the
rape statute violated equal protection under the U.S. Constitution because it
burdened only males not within the marital exemption and applied only to
males and not females. 70 Generally, when faced with an under-inclusive
statute, the court may either strike it down or enlarge the scope of the
statute to include those formerly exempted. 7' The Court of Appeals
recognized that in 1978, the legislature had expanded the definition of "not
married" to include spouses who were living apart pursuant to a court
order, and thus found the defendant to not be married for purposes of the
rape statute. 72 The Liberta court applied a rational basis test and held that
there was no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and nonmarital rape and found the marital rape exemption to be unconstitutional.7 3
The court also rejected the defendant's equal protection claim that the
64. Commonwealth v. Fogerty, 74 Mass. 489, 489 (8 Gray 1857).
65. Hasday, supra note 44, at 1392.
66. See State v. Rideout, 5 Fain. L. Rep. 2164 (Marion County Cir. Ct., Or. 1979)
(first prosecution for a man raping his wife, but the man was acquitted); Frazier v. State, 86
S.W. 754, 755 (Tex. 1905).
67. Wendy McElroy, Spousal Rape Case Sparks Old Debate, Intellectual
Conservative.com, Feb. 16, 2005, http://www.intellectualconservative.com/article4157.
html; Harless, supra note 3, at 318.
68. People v. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567, 576 (N.Y. 1984).
69. Id. at 570. Specifically, he claimed that the rape statute was under-inclusive and
that he should be considered married for purposes of the statute and exempt from
prosecution.
70. Id. at 569.
71. Merton v. State, 500 So. 2d 1301, 1305 (Ala. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Denney,
101 P.3d 1257, 1268 (Kan. 2004).
72. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 571 (the defendant was, in fact, living apart from his wife
pursuant to a Family Court Order).
73. Id. at 573.
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statute unfairly mendated that only males could be guilty of spousal rape
and concluded that the marital and gender exemptions must be removed
from the statute entirely.74 Furthermore, the court specifically addressed
and denounced the traditional Hale doctrine of implied consent as
justification for the marital rape exemption:
Any argument based on a supposed consent... is untenable.
Rape is not simply a sexual act to which one party does not
consent. Rather, it is a degrading, violent act which violates the
bodily integrity of the victim and frequently causes severe, longlasting physical and psychic harm. To ever imply consent to such
an act is irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape
statutes, marriage has never been viewed as giving a husband a
right to coerced intercourse on demand. Certainly, then, a marriage
should not be viewed
as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his
75
wife with impunity.
76
Today, the Liberta decision stands as the current case law.
Almost all state marital rape exemptions have been revised within the
past twenty-five years to be gender-neutral, regulating the rape of a spouse
rather than a female.77 The solution has generally been to abolish the
distinction between married and non-married persons entirely in order to
prosecute the crime of rape regardless of marital status.78 However some
scholars argue that the majority of states retain some form of the marital
79
rape exemption, suggesting that traditional norms remain to some extent.
Proponents of the exemption assert that there is value in retaining separate
statutes for sex crimes committed by spouses and continue to defend the

74. Id. at 576.
75. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 573 (citation omitted).
76. For subsequent cases that refer to the Liberta case as precedent, see Merton, 500
So. 2d at 1303; People v. Stefano, 121 Misc.2d 113 (N.Y. 1983), State v. Rider, 449 So. 2d
903 (1984).
77. See Amicus Brief in Support of Petitioners, U.S. v. Morrison, 991 F.2d 112 (4th
Cir. 1993), available at http://www.binghamton.edu/womhist/vawa/doc18.htm ("Like
domestic violence, rape is a form of assault that States have traditionally defined and
punished in explicitly sex-based terms.... While most States have now repealed or revised
that martial rape exemption, the record before Congress showed that, even after these
reforms, many States still refuse to protect women from husbands who rape or assault them.
. . . In short, until quite recently, States often denied and regulated rape and domestic
violence in overtly sex-based terms; some States still do. Even if a State revises its rape law
in gender-neutral language, legislators, police, prosecutors, judges, assailants and victims
still understand rape as a form of assault by men against women.").
78. Michael Dorf, The Domain of Reflexive Law, 103 COLUM. L. REv. 384 (2003)
(reviewing JEAN L. COHEN, REGULATING INTIMACY: A NEW LEGAL PARADIGM (2002));
Hasday, supra note 44, at 1496.
79. Anderson, supra note 34, at 1486; Michelle Anderson, From Chastity
Requirement to Sexuality License: Sexual Consent and a New Rape Shield Law, 70 GEO.
WASH. L. REv. 51 (2002); Weitzel, supra note 27, at 1042.
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doctrine by arguing that: (1) legal intervention into the private marital
domain is inappropriate;80 (2) spousal sexual offenses are not as harmful as
other rapes, so they do not warrant harsh criminal sanctions; 81 (3) the
exemption promotes marital reconciliation and the resumption of normal
marital relations; 82 and (4) there is a need to prevent vindictive wives from
pursuing false charges. 83 However the past few decades have illuminated
some fierce opposition to retaining these legal distinctions. Opponents
argue that women deserve legal protection from unwanted sex regardless of
marriage status, that the psychological consequences of wife-rape are often
more serious and devastating for a spouse-victim than for a non-spouse
victim, and that marital rape is a violation of women's autonomy, sexual
liberty, and integrity.84
A. REMNANTS OF SPOUSAL IMMUNITY

Despite the milestone abolition of the marital rape exemption in
Liberta, legal distinctions between marital rape and non-marital rape still
exist in states that continue to grant immunity to spouses for sex offenses
other than forcible rape.85 Twenty states currently grant or imply spousal
immunity from sexual offense charges if the spouse-victim is mentally
incapacitated or physically helpless.86 Researcher Michelle Anderson
found that in Oklahoma, Ohio, and South Carolina, husbands are immune
from rape charges "when they themselves administer the drugs, intoxicants,
87
or controlled substances to render their wives mentally incapacitated.,
Additionally, twelve states continue to grant spousal immunity for various
nonconsensual sexual offenses such as gross sexual imposition, sexual
abuse, sexual battery, sexual contact, and sexual misconduct.8 8 For
example, Kansas allows marriage as a defense for sexual battery, 89 while
80. Dettmer, supra note 8, at 711-12; Harless, supra note 3, at 313; Hasday, supra
note 44, at 1486.
81. Anderson, supra note 34, at 1500; COLLEEN WARD, ATtrTUDES TOWARDS RAPE:
FEMINIST & SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGICAL PERSPECTIVES 74 (Sage Publications 1995).

82. In People v. Brown, the Colorado Supreme Court stated, "the marital exemption
may remove a substantial obstacle to the resumption of normal marital relations." People v.
Brown, 632 P.2d 1025, 1027 (1981); Hasday, supra note 44, at 1487-88.
83. Hasday, supra note 44, at 1488.
84. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 575; Merton, 500 So. 2d 1305 (opposing any marital
distinction regarding the treatment of rape); Dorf, supra note 78 (illustrating that the trend is
to abolish any marital distinction in rape charges); Hasday, supra note 44, at 1491-93
(discussing the legal history of marital rape and the consequences it has on the victims).
85. Anderson, supra note 34, at 1486.
86. Anderson, supra note 34, at 1486-87.
87. Id. at 1486-88. For specific codes researched by Anderson, see OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 2907.02 (a) (West 2002); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21, § 1111 (West 2002); S.C. CODE
ANN. § 16-3-652 (2002).
88. Id. at 1489.
89. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 21-3517 (2005) ("[s]exual battery is the intentional touching
of the person of another who is 16 or more years of age, who is not the spouse of the
offender.").

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:2

Hawaii exempts spouses from sexual assault in the third degree. 90 These
spousal exemptions to sexual offenses other than forcible rape are remnants
of traditional notions that marriage included implied consent to sexual
intercourse. 9' "The marital exemption for mentally incapacitated rape,
unconscious rape, and sexual offenses without extra force.., rests on the
assumption that, because of the 'implied authorization' granted by
marriage, spousal sexual offenses that do not involve serious physical force
are not important enough or harmful enough for the justice system to
criminalize." 92 These laws are examples of the failure to recognize that
rape is a violent and serious offense regardless of one's marital status, and
consent to any unwanted sexual contact should never be implied. Critics
and feminists alike emphatically maintain that a marriage license should
never be viewed as a license for a husband to have any sexual rights over
his wife and that a married woman has the same right to control her own
body as an unmarried woman.93
B. MARRIAGE: A TICKET TO A LESSER PENALTY

Specific marital rape statutes and/or lesser penalties for sexual offenses
committed by spouses also indicate that the marital rape exemption still
exists to some degree. 94 North Carolina had an express marital rape
exemption, which was not repealed until 1993. 9' As of 2003, six states had
amended their statutes to include a specific spousal rape section, which
some argue is still a way of differentiating sexual crimes between spouses
as opposed to non-spouses.9 6 Of these six, Arizona, South Carolina,
Tennessee, and Virginia downgraded the severity of the crime by
mandating lesser penalties for spousal rape than for rapes committed by
others.97 However, Arizona, Tennessee, and Virginia have repealed these
90. HAW. REV. STAT. § 707-732 (2004).

91. Anderson, supra note 34, at 1497.
92. Id.
93. Liberta, 474 N.E.2d at 573; Merton, 500 So. 2d at 1303; Hasday, supra note 44,

at 1417 ("[w]omen's economic, legal, and bodily vulnerabilities in marriage were all
intricately connected. In demanding a woman's right to her own person, feminists fought all
of these inequalities simultaneously.").
94. Anderson, supra note 34, at 1490; Hasday, supra note 44, at 1484-85; Erin
Palmer, Antiquated Notions of Womanhood and the Myth of the Unstoppable Male: Why
Post-penetrationRape Should Be a Crime in North Carolina, 82 N.C.L. REV. 1258, 126364 (2004).
95. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-27.8 (2005); Harless, supra note 3, at 318.

96. For example, the California legislature amended the Penal Code to eliminate the
marital exemption for forcible spousal rape. CAL. PEN. CODE § 262 (West 2005). Arizona,
Connecticut, South Carolina, Tennessee, and Virginia also have spousal rape statutes.
Anderson, supra note 34, at 1490.
97. Anderson, supra note 34, at 1490-91 ("[aiggravated rape is a Class A felony, but
aggravated spousal rape is a Class B felony; rape is a Class B felony, but spousal rape is a
Class C felony."). See, e.g.. ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01 (2002) (prior to 2005, in

Arizona, sexual assault was considered a Class 2 felony, but spousal sexual assault was a
Class 6 felony and a judge had discretion to treat it as a misdemeanor); TENN. CODE ANN. §
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statutes within the past two years.98 Mississippi still provides a marital
exemption for sexual battery if the spouses are living together at the time of
the incident unless use of force and lack of consent can be shown. 99 Critics
argue that treating marital rape or other sexual offenses as less serious
crimes than the non-spousal equivalents will lead to a decrease in
convictions and reporting by sending a message to women that the state is
unwilling to intervene in marital privacy regardless of the consequences.' 00
C. ADDITIONAL REQUIREMENTS TO PROVING MARITAL RAPE

In addition to establishing the elements of non-marital rape, proving
marital sexual offenses in several states has additional requirements.10 1
These restrictions frequently come in the form of a statute of limitations for
reporting, living arrangements of spouses at the time of incident, and
additional showings of force or violence. 0 2 In Oklahoma, the crime of
0 3
spousal rape requires the showing of force or violence by the perpetrator.'
Four states still require prompt complaint (usually within three months) for
spousal sexual offenses but not for other rape victims. 10 4 For example, in

California, the spouse-victim must report the incident within one year, but
this requirement can be overcome with corroborating independent
evidence. 10 5 In South Carolina, spouse-victims of criminal sexual battery
must report the incident within thirty days.' 0 6 Researcher Michelle
Anderson noted that three states continue to require corroboration for
spousal sexual offenses: "Texas requires corroboration unless the
complainant makes a prompt outcry to authorities, New York requires
corroboration when a complainant's mental incapacity forms the basis of
her non-consent, and Ohio requires corroboration for the crime of sexual
imposition.,' 1 7
The prompt complaint and extra corroboration
requirements do not protect the many women who do not report within that
39-13-507 (2005) (all sexual offenses were downgraded for spouses, but this act was
repealed by Acts 2005, Ch. 456, § 2, effective June 18, 2005); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-615
(2004) (sexual battery is punishable up to thirty years in prison while spousal sexual battery
is only punishable up to ten years in prison).
98. ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1406.01 was repealed effective August 12, 2005;
TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-507 was repealed by Acts 2005, ch. 456, § 2, effective June 18,
2005; VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-67.2:1 (West 2004) (repealed 2005), c. 631, cl. 2.
99. MISS. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (West 2006); Bell, supra note 40, at 828.
100. Harless, supra note 3, at 323-24.
101. Bell, supra note 40, at 828; Harless, supra note 3, at 323.
102. Anderson, supra note 31, at 949-50; Anderson, supra note 34, at 1491-92.
103. OKLA. STAT. tit. 21, § 1111(B) (2006).

104. California, Illinois, South Carolina, and Texas. Anderson, supra note 31, at
949. See, e.g., CAL. PEN. CODE § 262 (West 2005); 720 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. 5/12-18(c)
(West 2004) (amended 2004 replaced with 2004 Ill. Legis. Serv. page no. 93-958 (West);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-615 (2004); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.07 (Vernon 2006).
105. CAL. PENAL CODE § 262 (West 2005).
106. S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-615 (2004).
107. Anderson, supra note 31, at 949-50.

HASTINGS WOMEN'S LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 18:2

time and/or are unable to provide any independent evidence or testimony
that the sexual assault occurred.' °8 Furthermore the spouse-victims of
marital rape face similar domestic violence obstacles in reporting due to
"emotional hurdles, prosecutors who ignore their wishes, and a general lack
of understanding regarding the seriousness of their situation."'0 9
Some commentators also claim that progressive legislation advocating
no-drop policies ignores the wishes of and further disadvantages the
spouse-victim." 0
For example, Kentucky law as of 2000 admitted
circumstantial evidence against a perpetrator if the spouse was unwilling to
testify so that the prosecution could proceed without the complainant's
consent."' While the legislative intent behind such no-drop policies (or
prosecutors' motive for adopting them) may have been to vigorously
prosecute perpetrators, the reality is that women are afforded no choice or
control over the prosecution. This may instill greater fear of reporting
incidents and discourage women or the spouse-victim from reporting due to
a loss of financial support if they are financially dependent on their 2spouse
and enforce the message that a woman has no control over her life. 1
Many states require that a couple be legally separated and living apart
and/or divorced at the time of the assault before certain criminal
prosecutions for sexual assault can proceed." 3 Furthermore a handful of
states refuse to prosecute spousal rape and sexual assault without an
additional showing of force, violence, duress, or threat of bodily harm by
the perpetrator. 1 4 Mississippi is even more restrictive, with a requirement
that the couple be living apart to prosecute a marital rape, unless there is a
showing of force.' 1 5 Some states exempt spouses from non-forcible crimes,
thus implying a required showing of physical force, whereas other 16forms of
coercion would suffice to prove a rape between unmarried parties."
IV. MARITAL RAPE LAWS ON AN INTERNATIONAL LEVEL
Internationally, marital rape is starkly subsumed in directives targeting
domestic violence. This section will analyze the treatment of marital rape
in the European Union's Resolution on the Reportfrom the Commission to
108. Id. at 978.
109. Harless, supra note 3, at 324.
110. Id. at 331-32.
111. Id.
112. Id. at 330.
113. Anderson, supra note 34, at 1494.
114. Connecticut, Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, Nevada, Oklahoma, South Carolina.
Anderson, supra note 34, at 1495. See, e.g., CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-70b (2006); IDAHO
CODE ANN. § 18-6107 (2006); MD. CODE ANN., CRIM. LAW § 3-303 (West 2006); Miss.
CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (West 2005); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.373 (2006); OKLA. STAT. tit.
21, § 1111 (B) (2006); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-3-615 (2004).
115. MIss. CODE ANN. § 97-3-99 (West 2006).
116. Iowa, Louisiana, Minnesota, and Rhode Island. Anderson, supra note 34,
at 1496.
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the Council, the EuropeanParliament,the Economic and Social Committee
and the Committee of the Regions on the State of Women's Health in the
European Community. The UN's 1993 Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women and the 1995 Beijing Declaration and Platform
for Action, a product of the UN Fourth World Conference on Women, will
also be examined for the European Union's attention to marital rape. In
addition, this section will analyze several Country Reports on Human
Rights Practices that the U.S. State Department presents to Congress each
year. This analysis will illustrate how various countries address marital
rape through the framework of domestic violence and/or non-marital rape
and show that treating marital rape as a private problem is part of
traditional cultural norms on an international level, as well as in the U.S.
A. A REPORT FROM THE EUROPEAN UNION
While there are countless international organizations and committees
dedicated to women's rights and stopping violence against women, there
are few, if any, legislative directives that specifically address the issue of
marital rape outside the context of domestic violence. In 1986, the
European Parliament adopted a Resolution on Violence Against Women, in
which it called for legal recognition of marital rape.117 More notably, on
June 21, 1999, the European Parliament took a collective look at various
international reports and conferences on women's health, such as a report
from the 1995 UN Beijing Conference and a report of the Committee on
Women's Rights, and issued the Resolution on the Report from the
Commission to the Council, the European Parliament,the Economic and
Social Committee and the Committee of the Regions on the State of
Women's Health in the European Community. 18 This Resolution called
for the criminalization of domestic violence in general and included marital
rape as domestic violence against women, but contained no separate
initiative or suggestion for prosecuting marital rape.11 9 The Resolution
contains twenty-seven objectives under the topics of general concerns,
reproductive health, diseases that affect women differently, violence
against women, and the health needs of aging women. Of the twenty-seven
objectives, only two (Number 22 and 23) are related to violence against
women. Objective 22 states that the European Parliament "calls on the
Commission to add into the programmes of health promotion coping with
violence against women, which is a serious physical and psychological
public health problem having damaging effects also on concerned
children's healthy development, and to promote research of and to
incorporate health aspects into Community financed campaigns on violence
117. 1986 0.1. (C 176) 73, 75.
118. 1999 O.J. (C 175) 68-72, availableat http://eur-lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/site/
en/oj/1999/c_175/c_17519990621en00680072.pdf.
119. Id. at 71.
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against women." 120 Objective 23 states that the European Parliament "calls
on the member states to make domestic violence against women, including
rape within marriage and sexual mutilation, a criminal offence and to set up
services to help women who are victims of this kind of violence."'1 2' Thus
marital rape is included in the fight against domestic violence, but it is not
addressed separately. Additionally the Resolution is not legally binding.
Some scholars argue that these mere suggestions do not have any actual
effect, while other scholars maintain that "domestic violence standards
have become part of customary international law, which is binding in
nature." 122 This resolution is just one example of how marital rape is
subsumed within the framework of addressing domestic violence in general
and is provided no separate recognition of its urgency, uniqueness, and
pervasiveness as a societal problem.
However, the European Parliament's Committee on Women's Rights
and Gender Equality in 2005 issued a report encouraging measures to
specifically criminalize marital sexual violence and marital rape. 23 The
committee urged the Member States to "recognize marital sexual violence
as a crime and to make rape within marriage a criminal offense [and] not to
accept any reference to cultural practice as an extenuating circumstance in
cases of men's violence against women."' 2 4 The Committee declared that
outdated cultural norms and legal barriers
facilitate an intolerable general
25
acceptance of a marital rape exemption.1
B. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AS DEFINED BY THE UNITED NATIONS

In December of 1993, the UN's High Commissioner published the
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women, which
established marital rape as a human rights violation.' 26 The declaration
also stated that "the term violence against women means any act of genderbased violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical, sexual or
psychological harm or suffering to women, including threats of such acts,
coercion or arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or
in private life."'' 27 Significantly, Article 2 of the declaration specifies that
Violence against women shall be understood to encompass, but not
120. Id.
121. Id.
122. Vesa, supra note 41, at 338.
123. Press Release, European Parliament, MEP's Urge Action to Fight Violence
Against Women, http://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/expert/infopress-page/014-2982-33211-48-902-200511281PR02917-28-11-2005-2005-false/defaulten.htm (last visited Jan. 29,
2007) (citing Report on the Current Situation in Combating Violence Against Women and
Any Future Action, Eur. ParI. Doc. A6-0404 (2005)).
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. UN Declaration, supra note 7.
127. Id.

Sumnmer 20071

MARITAL RAPE

be limited to, the following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring in
the family, including battering, sexual abuse of female children in
the household, dowry-related violence, marital rape, female genital
mutilation and other traditional practices harmful to women, nonspousal violence and violence related to exploitation;
(b) Physical, sexual and psychological violence occurring
within the general community, including rape, sexual abuse, sexual
harassment and intimidation at work, in educational institutions
and elsewhere, trafficking in women and forced prostitution;
(c) Physical, sexual and psychological 28violence perpetrated or
condoned by the State, wherever it occurs. 1
Both the UN declaration and the report from the European Parliament
specifically mention and include marital rape in the general prohibition
against domestic violence, but there is no separate treatment or legal
doctrine to address the unique issues associated with marital rape. Also,
the UN does not have the authority to bind unwilling members to such legal
doctrine. Therefore the declaration merely urges all member states to
recognize and adhere to its recommendations. However not all member
states fully recognize it.
The UN used this definition of violence against women when it held
the UN Fourth World Conference on Women in Beijing, China in 1995.129
The UN issued the Beijing Declarationand Platformfor Action, which not
only included the definition of violence against women, but specifically
recognized that:
Violence against women is a manifestation of the historically
unequal power relations between men and women, which have
led to domination over and discrimination against women by men
and to the prevention of women's full advancement. Violence
against women throughout the life cycle derives essentially from
cultural patterns, in particular the harmful effects of certain
traditional or customary practices and all acts of extremism linked
to race, sex, language or religion that perpetuate the lower status
accorded to women in the family, the workplace, the community
and society. Violence against women is exacerbated by social
pressures, notably the shame of denouncing certain acts that have
been perpetrated against women; women's lack of access to legal
information, aid or protection; the lack of laws that effectively
128. Id.
129. Fourth World Conference on Women, Beijing, P.R.C., Sept. 4-15 1995, Beijing
Declaration and Platform for Action, I 113, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.177/20 (Oct. 17, 1995),

available at http://www.un.org/esa/gopher-data/conf/fwcw/off/a--20.en.
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prohibit violence against women; failure to reform existing laws;
inadequate efforts on the part of public authorities to promote
awareness of and enforce existing laws; and the absence of
educational and other means
to address the causes and
30
consequences of violence. 1
While the Beijing declaration also merged marital rape into the
definition of violence against women, it is significant that the UN
specifically connected violence against women to socio-cultural norms that
reinforce and suggest an acceptance, justification, and tolerance for
practices that should not and cannot be tolerated any longer. Further, in
1996, the Commission on Human rights issued a report called Alternative
Approaches and Ways and Means Within the United Nations System for
Improving the Effective Enjoyment of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms: A Frameworkfor Model Legislation on Domestic Violence.
The report stipulated that there should be "no restrictions on women
bringing suits against their spouses and that evidence, criminal, and civil
procedure codes should be amended to provide such remedy." 131
C. COUNTRY OVERVIEWS: CLINGING TO CULTURAL NORMS

Marital rape remains a pervasive problem in many countries and,
despite many strides of progress towards its criminalization and effective
32
prosecution, it is often shielded by the veil of family and marital privacy.1
"Insufficient awareness of the consequences of domestic violence, how to
prevent it and the rights of victims still exists.... [T]he legal and
legislative measures, especially in the criminal justice area, to eliminate
different forms of violence against women... are weak in many
countries."' 33 For example, the "Mexican penal code did not consider
marital rape a crime," and the Mexican Supreme Court stated in 1994 that
"violently forcing a spouse to have sex was merely an 'abusive exercise of
a conjugal right,"' supporting the notion that marriage is a license for
sexual relations. 134 However in November of 2005 the Mexican Supreme
Court overturned the 1994 decision and found "that forced sex within
marriage is considered rape and punishable by law." 135 Similarly, the
130. Id. at 118.
131. U.N. Commission on Human Rights [ESCOR], Commission on Human Rights,
Report of the Special Rapporteur on

Violence Against Women,

Its Causes and

Consequences, 10, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1996/53/Add.2 (Feb. 2, 1996) (preparedby Radhika
Coomarasway).
132. Ramyata Limbu, Marital Rape Outlawed by Nepal's Supreme Court, PANOS
LONDON, Jan. 10, 2002, http://www.panos.org.uk/global/featuredetails.asp?featureid=
1062&ID=1005 (last visited March 28, 2007).
133. Vesa, supra note 41, at 317-18.
134. Press Release, IPAS, Mexican High Court Now Defines Marital Sex Assaults as
Rape (Dec. 8, 2005), http://www.ipas.org/english/press-room/2005/releases/12082005.asp.
135. Id.
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Human Rights Commission of Malaysia, Suhakam submitted a penal code
amendment to the Parliamentary Select Committee to include marital rape
as a penal offense.1 36 One article highlighted that the recommendation had
been attacked by Muslim religious intellectuals who saw the amendment as
contrary to Islam and the institution of marriage. 137 A religious advisor
argued that marital rape "is relevant only to non-Muslims [because] Islamic
law is adequate to check 38a husband's abuses" and they can turn to the
Syariah Court for redress.
The U.S. Department of State submits an annual report entitled
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices to Congress, which covers
internationally recognized individual, civil, political, and worker rights as
set forth in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights. The reports are
segmented into geographic locations such as Europe and Eurasia, Africa,
the Near East, North Africa, and East Asia and the Pacific. Each segment
contains an overview of various countries' current state of affairs on
domestic violence and rape laws. In Macedonia, for example, legal
recourse is available for marital rape victims, but cultural norms that
discourage reporting and a lack of internal practical police training in
domestic violence have made criminal charges on the grounds of domestic
violence very rare.' 39 "Victims of family violence often were reluctant to
bring charges against perpetrators because of the shame it would inflict on
the family, and police were limited in their ability to respond to allegations
of domestic violence and spousal rape if the crime did not occur in police
presence."'' 40 Similarly, the 2004 report for Ethiopia stated that there is no
specific law addressing domestic violence (which includes wife beatings
and marital rape) and societal norms prevented women from seeking legal
14 1
redress and obstructed investigations and prosecutions in rape cases.
Furthermore the common, yet illegal, practice of abducting women and
girls as a pathway to forced marriage often left women in forced sexual
relationships, but courts recognized such marriages as a valid defense of
abduction and/or rape. 42 "In cases of abduction by marriage, the
perpetrator was not punished if the victim agreed to marry him (unless the
marriage was annulled); even after a perpetrator was convicted, the

136. Letter from Zarizana Abdul Aziz, Vice President of Women's Centre for
Change Penang, to the Press, Family Cannot Be a Place of Violence, (Sept. 16, 2004),
http://www.wccpenang.org/wcc/index.php?option-com-content&task-view&id=56
&Itemid=91.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. U.S. Dep't of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2004, 109134 (U.S. Gov't. Printing Office 2005), available at http://www.intemationalrelations.
house.gov/archives/educate.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2007).
140. Id.
141. Id. at 224.
142. Id. at 224-25.
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sentence was commuted if the victim married him."' 143 The 2004 State
Department report for China (including Tibet, Hong Kong, and Macau),
explained that the 2002 Statute Law Bill specifically criminalized marital
rape. In 2003, the Chinese legislature passed an amendment to the Crimes
Ordinance to clarify that unlawful sexual intercourse could be applied both
outside and inside the bounds of marriage. 144 The Near East and North
Africa report on Jordan stated that marital rape is currently not illegal and
acknowledged that religious, familial, and societal pressures and norms
play a large role in discouraging victims from seeking medical or legal
help.' 45 "Wife-battering technically was a grounds for divorce, but a
husband may seek to demonstrate that he has authority from the Koran to
correct a perceived irreligious or disobedient wife by striking her.', 146 This
is starkly akin to the old theories of coverture and unity (as discussed above
47
in Part II) dating back to pre-twentieth century English common law.
These Country Reports provide a small insight into the global perspective
on marital rape and illustrate that many countries still hold socio-cultural
norms similar to those that supported the marital rape exemption in the
British and U.S. tradition.
V. CHALLENGES IN LEGISLATING AND ENFORCING
MARITAL RAPE LAWS
A significant barrier to addressing the problem of marital rape
effectively is that it is often subsumed within the legislation concerning
either domestic violence or non-marital rape, even though marital rape has
unique features that place it somewhere in between the two. Domestic
violence encompasses a tension between family privacy and protection by
the state. Rape, however, is caught in a tension between consent and
evidentiary proof. The statutory schemes and legal history of domestic
violence and marital rape have progressed along similar lines and present
similar problems. Marital rape presents distinct issues that warrant unique
solutions.148 Primarily, marital rape legislation, prosecution, and survivor
rehabilitation must specifically address the issues that can collectively be
drawn from the frameworks of domestic violence and non-marital rape.
"The nature of violence in an intimate relationship creates some distinct
143. Id. at 225.
144. Id. at 714. See also Liberta, 474 N.E.2d 567 (In comparison with the U.S. as a
whole, the 1984 decision of People v. Liberta abolished the distinction between marital and
non-marital rapes in the state of New York, but marital rape did not become a crime in all
fifty states until 1993.).
145. U.S. Dep't of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2004 vol.
II sec. 5, at 1876 (U.S. Gov't Printing Office, 2005), available at http://www.international
relations.house.gov/archives/educate.htm (last visited Jan. 29, 2007).
146 Id.
147. Schelong, supra note 39, at 86.
148. Harless, supra note 3, at 308.
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social and psychological problems that affect the victim's position in the
legal system ....
The criminal justice system treats rape that involves
strangers as more serious than rape involving an intimate."'' 49 Marital rape
victims also face unique emotional and economic barriers to leaving their
husband-batterer. 150 Survivors often feel particularly violated by someone
with whom they shared marriage vows and may be financially unable to
leave their spouses and children. Both internationally and domestically,
governments, judicial courts, and law enforcement need to recognize these
differences and build a framework for specifically treating victims and
prosecuting perpetrators of marital rape.
Secondly, treating marital rape as a crime will require more than
legislation. Simply declaring that marriage will not be a defense to rape
will not end these offenses. 5 1 Adequately addressing the issue must
encompass public awareness of a victim's rights, a responsive and trained
police force, a supportive network of agencies and organizations to assist in
the treatment of victims, and a court system of prosecutors, judges and
juries that will legitimize marital rape claims and send a message that
marital rape will not be tolerated. 152 In addition to the slow and reluctant
legal recognition that a marriage license is not a license to rape, women are
often reluctant or reticent to report marital rape. 153 In a recent issue of the
South China Morning Post, one headline read: "Marital Rape Victims
Ignorant of Law Change; Not One Case Has Been Prosecuted Since
Amendment Took Effect in 2002."' 154 This headline demonstrates the gulf
between newly made legislation and the implementation of that legislation
by prosecutors. Thus an effective remedy requires that women have
knowledge of their rights and the encouragement to report incidents of
marital rape.
Thirdly, a significant barrier to global enforcement of marital rape
prosecutions is that countries will adhere to their respective governmental
dictates, and no international declaration or initiative is legally binding
upon all countries. "While declarations and international conferences are
pertinent for pointing out such issues of wide concern and for suggesting
solutions, they do not create binding obligations that require states to
enforce these solutions ... [they] carry political weight, but they are not, on
their own, legally binding instruments unless they are seen as embodying
notions of customary human rights law, which has a legally binding effect

149. Id. at 308-09.
150. Id. at 310; Lucas, supra note 4, at 786-87.
151. Anderson, supra note 34, at 1554.
152. Juthani, supra note 15, at 56.
153. Harless, supra note 3, at 308.
154. Norma Connolly, MaritalRape Victims Ignorantof Law Change; Not One Case
Has Been ProsecutedSince Amendment Took Effect in 2002, S. CHINA MORNING POST, Oct.
17, 2005, at 4.
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upon states." '55 Consideration of marital rape laws as binding customary
norms requires opiniojuris and a general universal practice of regarding it
as a crime.156 However marital rape laws currently have seen no such
The reports and
global consistency of legislative treatment.
recommendations of various international committees and organizations
strongly urge countries to follow their initiative, but the reports alone
cannot mandate that member states or countries fully incorporate such
suggestions.
VI. CONCLUSION
Effectively addressing marital rape will require specific attention to its
unique problems and consequences without subsuming them solely within
the frameworks of domestic violence or non-marital rape. There is a
domestic and international need for judicial and systemic reform to remove
the procedural barriers that accompany the reporting and prosecutorial
obstacles of marital rape cases. There must be more comprehensive
research and statistical data on the specific effects and prevalence of
marital rape on a global scale. Furthermore there is a strong need for
legislative consistency between the states in the United States and other
countries and a global recognition of the seriousness of marital rape as a
violent crime with serious impacts on its spouse-victims.
While the past three decades have seen significant strides towards the
abolition of the marital rape exemption, as we begin the twenty-first
century, much more legislative and socio-cultural reform is needed. The
failure to criminalize marital rape in some countries, or exemptions for
lesser sexual offenses or imposition of less serious sanctions for
perpetrators in the United States, shows that remnants of the marital rape
exemption exist. Furthermore implementing and changing legislation "on
the books" can sometimes be very different from the "law in action." It
may be decades before countries that have only recently criminalized
marital rape show significant progress in reporting, prosecuting, and
minimizing marital rape. Adequately addressing marital rape will require
public awareness and encouragement to report these crimes, an effective
law enforcement network, a comprehensive network of agencies and
organizations to assist in treatment for marital rape victims and a court
system that takes these cases seriously. A global consensus must recognize
155. Harless, supra note 3, at 318.
156. The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)("Where there is no treaty, and
no controlling executive or legislative act or judicial decision, resort must be had to the
customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as evidence of these, to the works of jurists
and commentators, who by years of labor, research, and experience, have made themselves
peculiarly well acquainted with the subjects of which they treat. Such works are resorted to
by judicial tribunals, not for the speculations of their authors concerning what the law ought
to be, but for trustworthy evidence of what the law really is.").

Summer 2007]

MARITAL RAPE

293

that marital rape is a violent and serious crime that can never be accepted,
rationalized or justified.
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